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Abstract 
Using an international sample of large banks between 2000 and 2010, we evaluate the risk 
sensitivity of minimum capital requirements. Our results show that risk-weighted assets (the 
regulatory measure of portfolio risk which determines minimum capital requirements) are ill-
calibrated to a market measure of bank portfolio risk. We show that this low-risk sensitivity of 
capital requirements permits banks to build up capital buffers by underreporting their portfolio 
risk and undermines banks’ ability to withstand adverse shocks. While the risk sensitivity of 
capital requirements is higher for banks that have adopted Basel II, it remains low across banks 
and countries.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper explores a simple and yet unanswered question. To what extent are minimum capital 
requirements sensitive to the portfolio risk of banks? Risk-sensitive capital requirements are a 
keystone of international capital regulation. Their purpose is to prevent bank shareholders from 
investing in risky assets in order to capitalize on underpriced government bailout guarantees (Kim and 
Santomero, 1988; Rochet, 1992). However, the effectiveness of risk-based capital regulation in 
preventing shareholders from taking excessive risks rests on the extent to which capital requirements 
are an accurate reflection of the portfolio risk of each bank. Discrepancies between capital 
requirements and bank portfolio risk allow banks to game the system by investing in assets which 
maximize returns while reducing capital requirements in favor of more levered activities (Jones, 2000; 
Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez, 2013; Hellwig, 2010).  
The financial crisis that started in 2007 illustrates that, despite numerous refinements and 
revisions over the last two decades, capital adequacy rules have failed to ensure that regulatory capital 
requirements are in line with the riskiness of bank assets. From the onset of the financial crisis, fears 
that banks hold insufficient capital have raised doubts over bank solvency and critically undermined 
the functioning of interbank markets.* Some commentators argue that one reason why banks held 
insufficient capital as they entered the crisis was because regulatory capital requirements were 
insufficiently attuned to the riskiness of bank activities (Acharya and Richardson, 2009; Basel 
Committee, 2009; 2011; Hellwig, 2010). When banks are not subject to regulatory capital 
requirements which are commensurate with their portfolio risk, bank solvency is likely to be at stake 
during adverse shocks to the value of bank asset portfolios. 
In this paper, we empirically assess the risk sensitivity of capital requirements to bank 
portfolio risk. Our empirical strategy is to estimate the extent to which increases in risk-weighted 
                                                       
*
 See for example, ‘Basel Accord sits at the root of the ongoing banking crisis’, Financial Times (7 November 
2007); ‘Turmoil reveals the inadequacy of Basel II, Financial Times (27 February 2008); ‘Basel: the mouse that 
did not roar’, Financial Times, (15 September 2010). 
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assets (RWA)—the regulatory measure of bank portfolio risk which determines minimum capital 
requirements—are linked to increases in a market measure of portfolio risk. The main market measure 
of portfolio risk we use is the standard deviation of bank asset returns derived from option pricing 
theory (Ronn and Verma, 1986; Flannery and Rangan, 2008). Since we contrast RWA (via its 
implications for minimum capital requirements) with asset volatility, our paper effectively contrasts 
the regulatory and the market perception of bank portfolio risk. 
Our sampling period includes banks that report RWA according to both the original Basel 
Accord on capital requirements and the Basel II revisions (effective from 2007 in many countries), 
but ends before additional revisions (Basel III) will have been fully implemented by 2018. Still, our 
paper has important implications for Basel III for two reasons. First, the Basel III proposals are 
motivated by the perceived failings of capital regulations with respect to their risk sensitivity before 
the financial crisis (Basel Committee, 2009; 2010). As our paper focuses on Basel I and II, we can 
shed light on the extent to which such criticisms are justified. Second, because Basel III maintains 
many of the defining features of the previous Accords (see Hellwig, 2010), intrinsic flaws in the risk 
sensitivity of Basel I and II, which we study in this paper, are bound to carry over and will also be 
present under Basel III. The Basel Committee (2011, pg. 31) estimates that RWA under Basel III will 
increase by no more than 23 percent for large banks relative to Basel II. Whether this increase in 
RWA is likely to be sufficient (or, alternatively, whether substantially larger increases in RWA are 
warranted; see Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer, 2010; Miles, Marcheggiano and Yang, 
2012) will depend on the risk sensitivity of capital requirements under Basel I and Basel II.  
By way of preview, we start the analysis by examining the risk sensitivity of capital 
requirements for an international sample of large banks between 2000 and 2010. We demonstrate that 
capital requirements are only loosely related to our market measure of the portfolio risk of banks. 
Owing to this weak risk calibration, even pronounced increases in portfolio risk generate almost 
negligible increases in capital requirements. To illustrate this, we show that when annual portfolio risk 
increases nearly threefold (from 2.1 percent to 6.2 percent), the average bank in our sample faces 
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additional capital requirements of 0.78 percentage points (assuming capital requirements of 8 percent 
of RWA).  
Next, we inspect the annual reports of each sample bank to identify banks that report RWA 
according to Basel II. Our results show that under Basel II banks display only a marginal 
improvement in the risk sensitivity of their capital requirements. Most importantly, however, the 
internal ratings-based (IRB) approach under Basel II has introduced asymmetric risk elasticities for 
low- and high-risk bank portfolios. While banks with low-risk portfolios reduce their capital 
requirements when adopting the IRB approach, banks with high-risk portfolios are not required to 
hold significantly more capital. This implies that banks with the riskiest asset portfolios are 
particularly at risk of holding insufficient capital under Basel II.  
Asset volatility is affected by many factors external to bank management. Therefore, we do 
not intend to suggest that RWA should exactly track a market measure of bank portfolio risk. 
However, our results clearly show that the risk sensitivity of capital requirements is very weak and 
that this has undesirable consequences. First, we show the capital buffers which banks typically hold 
above regulatory requirements partly result from capital arbitrage. We show this by demonstrating 
that banks with higher capital buffers report lower amounts of RWA per unit of assets for a given 
level of portfolio risk. As a result, banks may be undercapitalized in spite of holding capital well 
above the minimum regulatory requirements (Allen, Carletti and Marquez, 2011). Second, we show 
that capital arbitrage diminishes banks’ ability to withstand adverse shocks. We show that banks that 
increased their capital buffers markedly during 2008 and 2009 and did so relying at least in part on 
government support displayed a particularly low risk sensitivity of their capital requirements between 
2000 and 2007.  
Our paper contributes to previous studies on capital and risk in banking. First, our analysis 
provides the first empirical investigation which links international capital adequacy rules to a market 
measure of bank portfolio risk. Previous work on capital and risk has not examined whether 
international capital requirements are in line with bank risk. Instead, extant empirical work has 
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focused on whether the amount of capital which banks hold is in line with bank risk (e.g., Shrieves 
and Dahl, 1992; Jacques and Nigro, 1997; Calem and Rob, 1999; Peura and Keppo, 2006; Flannery 
and Rangan, 2008).  
Second, our results help explain the repeatedly reported finding that regulatory capital ratios 
perform poorly in predicting bankruptcy and distress more generally in the banking industry (e.g., 
Estrella, Park and Peristiani, 2000; IMF, 2009). In essence, our results show that before 2008 banks 
built up regulatory capital buffers via capital arbitrage, which allowed them to hold sizable capital 
buffers and yet remain intrinsically undercapitalized (see Allen et al., 2011) . 
Finally, our results can be used as a benchmark for impending Basel III capital adequacy rules 
and, therefore, contribute to work which examines the effects of ongoing revisions of the Basel 
Accord (Feess and Hege, 2011; Kashyap, Stein and Hanson, 2010; Admati et al., 2010). Based on the 
projected 23 percent increase in risk-weighted assets for large banks under Basel III relative to Basel 
II (Basel Committee, 2011, pg. 31), we estimate that Basel III will require banks in our sample to 
hold, on average, no more than 1.20 percent of additional capital per unit of assets under a minimum 
regulatory capital ratio of 8 percent (and no more than 1.94 percent if the minimum capital ratio is 13 
percent).† This shows that Basel III hardly represents a systemic overhaul in terms of capital 
regulation. From the results reported in this paper, it is therefore questionable whether the targeted 
increases in the risk sensitivity of capital requirements will be sufficient to ensure that capital 
requirements will become commensurate with bank portfolio risk under Basel III.  
We organize the paper as follows. The next section describes the background and conceptual 
framework of our study. Sections 3 and 4 explain our sampling and our methodological approaches 
respectively. Section 5 reports the main results on the risk sensitivity of capital requirements. We 
examine whether Basel II has improved the risk sensitivity of capital requirements in Section 6. 
                                                       
†
 We derive these figures by adjusting the values of RWA for each bank to a 23 percent increase in RWA. We 
then compute the difference in minimum capital requirements per unit of assets relative to the original values of 
RWA. 
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Section 7 examines whether bank capital buffers above minimum regulatory requirements influence 
the risk sensitivity of capital requirements. Section 8 presents the results of additional anlyses and the 
final section concludes.  
2. Background and Conceptual Framework:  
How Risk-Sensitive are Regulatory Capital Requirements? 
Capital regulation has been designed to improve the safety and soundness of banks. Its theoretical 
foundations rest on the view that absent minimum regulatory requirements for capital banks will hold 
insufficient capital to absorb losses. In essence, bank shareholders will take on high portfolio risks in 
an attempt to maximize the value of deposit insurance and other implicit or explicit government 
guarantees. Capital regulation may offset incentives for bank shareholders to shift risk. If banks are 
required to hold capital as an increasing function of portfolio risk, shareholders will be forced to 
absorb the losses linked to bank risk taking (e.g., Sharpe, 1978; Furlong and Keeley, 1989; Calem and 
Rob, 1999). However, Kim and Santomero (1988) and Rochet (1992) show that if capital 
requirements do not accurately reflect portfolio risk, they distort a bank’s risk choices towards more 
risky assets. This is because shareholders seek to offset the negative effect of additional capital 
holdings on expected returns by making riskier portfolio choices.‡  
It follows from this that if capital regulation is to prevent banks from holding excessively 
risky asset portfolios, regulatory capital requirements ought to be highly calibrated to the riskiness of 
                                                       
‡
 Arguably, weak risk calibration is only one of several aspects of capital regulation which can cause banks to 
shift risk. Various authors have examined other behavioral implications of capital regulation which could also 
encourage Risk-shifting. For instance, Furlong and Keeley (1989) and Calem and Rob (1999) argue whether 
capital regulations ensue risk-taking depends on the overall capital holdings of a bank (generally, lower holdings 
generate gambling-type risky behaviour). Repullo and Suarez (2004), and Kopecky and VanHoose (2006) look 
at the effect that capital regulations have on loan rationing (and therefore indirectly at the composition of a 
bank’s asset portfolios). Repullo (2004) looks at the role of competition and Peura and Keppo (2006) and 
Flannery and Rangan (2008) at market discipline in affecting the effect of capital rules on bank risk-taking. 
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bank assets. To this end, the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision recommended common risk-
based bank capital adequacy rules across most countries. The Basel Accord of 1988 introduced 
minimum standards for capital as a fixed proportion of the risk exposure of a bank, which is measured 
using the volume of risk-weighted assets (RWA).§ RWA are the weighted sum of various on- and off-
balance sheet exposures which, owing to revisions to the Accord in the mid-nineties, also include 
market risk. 
The Basel II revisions introduced important changes to the algorithm used to determine a 
bank’s risk exposures to make ‘the Framework more risk-sensitive than the 1988 Accord’ (Basel 
Committee, 2006a, pg. 17). The primary mechanisms used to enhance the sensitivity of capital 
requirements to bank portfolio risk was the introduction of more granular risk weights (which also 
included operational risk) and to grant banks some choice over the risk weights they apply. 
Critical for our paper is the notion that under capital adequacy rules, the risk weights assigned 
to each asset class reflect a regulatory assessment of the economic risks associated with this type of 
asset. From its inception, the risk-weighting methodology has been criticized as insufficiently fine-
tuned to distinguish between the riskiness of different portfolio choices of banks in an accurate 
manner (Avery and Berger, 1991; Jones, 2000; Hellwig, 2010).** Indeed, a number of studies have 
confirmed the existence of conceptual weaknesses in the Basel risk-weighting approach. For instance, 
Jacques and Nigro (1997) observe that the proportion of risk weighted to total assets is negatively 
                                                       
§
 The Basel Accord also defines the types of assets which qualify as capital. While national regulators may draw 
up slightly different rules, generally a distinction is made between Tier 1 capital (which is largely restricted to 
equity) and Tier 2 capital (mainly in the form of loan loss allowances and subordinated debt). National 
regulators will require banks to hold capital as a fixed percentage of risk-weighted assets, the sum of which is 
typically no less than 8 percent of RWA. 
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related to the capital holdings of U.S. banks in the first year that the Basel Accord took effect. 
Estrella, Park and Peristiani (2000) show that risk-adjusted capital ratios did not outperform simple 
capital to (unweighted) asset ratios when predicting U.S. bank failures in the early 1990s. An IMF 
(2009) study shows that banks in Europe and the U.S. that received capital assistance from 
governments during 2008–09 displayed higher regulatory capital ratios over the preceding decade 
than banks that were not in need of government assistance. 
Discrepancies between the regulatory assessment and the economic risks of bank assets 
incentivize banks to engage in capital arbitrage which will further corrode the sensitivity of capital 
requirements with respect to portfolio risk (Merton, 1995; Jones, 2000). Capital arbitrage is 
particularly advantageous for banks that view raising capital as expensive and that will, therefore, 
seek to avoid holding capital above levels they deem optimal. Ultimately, such arbitrage activities will 
result in a riskier banking sector where capital requirements bear little relation to the economic risks 
of bank portfolios.  
In response to these criticisms, additional revisions to the capital adequacy Framework (Basel 
III), which will gradually be phased in until 2018, have recently been proposed (see Basel Committee, 
2009; 2010).†† However, Basel III will maintain many of the defining features of the previous Basel 
Accords, above all the general risk-weighting approach (Hellwig, 2010; Admati et al., 2010). The 
                                                                                                                                                                         
**
 Concerns over the accuracy of the risk weights and capital arbitrage which will result have accompanied both 
Basel I and Basel II. See for instance, ‘Thank Basel for Credit Crunch’, Wall Street Journal, 4 November 1992; 
‘Basel II under Fire - Further Revisions to the New Bank Capital Accord Are Needed’, Financial Times, 21 
August 2003; ‘How Banks Learned to Play the System’, Financial Times, 7 May 2009. 
††
 Basel III will introduce important changes with potential consequences for the risk-sensitivity of capital 
requirements. Inter alia, Basel III will introduce higher risk weights for securitizations and off-balance sheet 
activities and, more generally, mandate increases in both the quantity and quality of capital requirements (for 
instance, Tier 1 capital will increase from 4 percent to 6 percent of RWA). Also, the Basel rules will require 
non-U.S. banks to maintain a non-risk-based leverage ratio for the first time (this ratio will be limited to 3 
percent of total assets and it will be netted against risk-based capital requirements). 
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extent to which regulatory capital requirements reflect the portfolio risk of a bank, therefore, remains 
an important issue—not only against the background of the apparent failings of risk-based capital 
rules in the recent past, but also because risk-based capital requirements will continue to play a key 
role in international capital regulation. 
3. The Sample  
To analyze the risk sensitivity of capital requirements, we build a cross-country sample of large listed 
banking organizations. We focus on large banks, because the systemic relevance of large banks makes 
it particularly advantageous for them to make risky asset choices in order to maximize the value of the 
safety net.  
We start by collecting the 650 largest banks (by USD assets) listed on Datastream on a yearly 
basis between 2000 and 2010.‡‡ In order to implement the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
systems estimator described in Section 4.2, we require that sample banks have at least five 
consecutive years of equity return data on Datastream and five years of accounting data on Bureau 
van Dijk’s Bankscope database. Applying these sample criteria yields an initial sample of 4,575 
observations. 
Next, we exclude cooperative banks, government-owned institutions, long-term credit banks 
and Islamic banks, because the risk choices and capital management decisions at these institutions are 
less likely to be driven by shareholder value considerations. Finally, we omit regional banks in Japan, 
because, in contrast to the rest of the sample, the regulatory capital requirements of these institutions 
                                                       
‡‡
 Our sample therefore excludes pure investment banks that are not consistently (across time and countries) 
subject to the Basel Accord. 
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are not stipulated by the Basel Accord.§§ The application of these selection criteria reduces the sample 
size by more than 1,000 observations. 
*******TABLE 1 HERE****** 
Furthermore, since some capital management decisions are likely to be made at the level of 
the holding company rather than at subsidiary-level, we omit banks that are subsidiaries of other 
banking firms from our sample. We obtain data on the ownership structure as of the last fiscal year 
from Bankscope to identify a bank as a subsidiary if a single shareholder directly or indirectly holds a 
majority (>50 percent) of the voting equity. Since Bankscope does not provide ownership data before 
the last fiscal year for which data are reported, we inspect banks that Bankscope identifies as having a 
majority shareholder to determine how long the majority shareholding has existed.*** We use 
Thomson Ownership as well as 13f filings (for U.S. banks) to retrieve historical ownership data. We 
augment this with acquisition data from Thomson Financial Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) 
database, because M&A are the most frequent mode by which independent banks in our sample 
become subsidiaries. If we are still unable to determine the fiscal year in which a bank became a 
subsidiary, we run news searches using LexisNexis and Factiva. Finally, we hand-collect missing data 
on regulatory capital and RWA from annual reports to recover a total of 348 bank-year observations.  
Table 1 reports the distribution of the final sample by country and year. Panel A shows that 
the sample consists of 246 unique banks chartered in 41 countries. The total number of observations 
                                                       
§§
 The capital adequacy rules pertaining to regional banks in Japan differ in the way that risk-weighted assets are 
computed. Also, regional banks in Japan are subject to a reduced minimum regulatory capital ratio of 4 percent. 
The lower regulatory capital requirements may affect capital management practices at Japanese regional banks, 
for instance by reducing banks’ incentives to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage.  
***
 If we were to omit all banks that have a majority shareholder in the last fiscal year for the duration of the 
entire sample period, this could introduce a serious selection bias. For instance, by doing so, we might well 
exclude many underperforming and distressed institutions which had become acquisition targets earlier in the 
sampling period. 
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equals 2,272 with the average bank entering the sample for approximately nine years. Panel B shows 
that the yearly number of unique banks ranges between 178 (in 2000) and 236 (in 2005).  
4. Methods 
4.1 REGULATORY AND MARKET ASSESSMENT OF BANK PORTFOLIO RISK 
To examine the degree to which risk-based capital requirements are reflective of the portfolio risk of a 
bank, we compare the bank risk assessment undertaken by regulators with a market-based measure of 
portfolio risk.  
Following Avery and Berger (1991), Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Berger (1995) and others, the 
bank risk assessment undertaken by regulators, RWATA, is computed as the proportion of risk-
weighted assets in total assets (TA). Under the original Basel Accord, this ratio reflects credit risk and 
market risk exposures as follows:  
RWATA = (RWACR + 12.5*C_RWAMR)/TA = (RWACR+RWAMR)/TA  (1) 
where RWACR is the volume of risk-weighted assets linked to a bank’s credit risk exposure (based on 
the risk weights for on- and off-balance assets). C_RWAMR is the amount of capital required for 
market risk exposure which is converted into the equivalent amount of risk-weighted assets by 
multiplying it by 12.5 .  
Basel II introduces a different weighting system for credit risk by giving banks the possibility 
to opt either for the standardized approach or for the internal rating-based (IRB) approach when 
determining capital adequacy. Further, Basel II introduces capital requirements for operational risk. 
Thus, under Basel II the ratio of RWA to total assets can be expressed as follows:  
RWATA = [RWACR_SD(IRB) + 12.5*(C_RWAMR + C_RWAOR)]/TA =   
(RWACR + RWAMR + RWAOR)/TA,      (2) 
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where RWACR_SD(IRB) is the volume of risk-weighted assets linked to a bank’s credit risk exposure 
(based on either the standardized [SD] or the IRB approach), and C_RWAMR and C_RWAOR are the 
amount of capital required for market risk and operational risk exposure respectively. As under Basel 
I, C_RWAM and C_RWAOR are then converted into the equivalent amount of risk-weighted assets by 
multiplying them by 12.5. In Equations (1) and (2), RWA will be mostly driven by credit risk 
exposure if banks have a strong lending focus. 
In this paper, we contrast the regulatory risk assessment underlying capital requirements with 
a market measure of each bank’s asset volatility. We follow Ronn and Verma (1986), Flannery and 
Sorescu (1996) and Flannery and Rangan (2008) and derive a bank’s asset volatility by using the 
market value of equity to solve the asset value and its volatility. Asset volatility is a suitable measure 
for portfolio risk, because it reflects both asset and liability returns as well as changes in off-balance 
items and operating efficiencies. By contrast, other market measures of bank risk (most notably, 
measures of bank default risk) are less suited to capture portfolio risk not least because these 
indicators are themselves functions of bank capital strength.
†††
 
We infer asset volatility ( ) using an iterative process based on the Black-Scholes-Merton 
pricing model. We express the market value of a bank’s equity (VE,t) as a function of the 
(unobservable) market value of assets (VA,t) by solving the following system of nonlinear equations:  
      (3) 
      (4) 
                                                       
†††
 The default risk of a bank is not only determined by the riskiness of its assets, but also by the amount of 
capital that banks hold against their asset portfolios. Consequently, two banks with identical portfolio risk may 
display very different levels of default risk if their capital holdings are different (see Nier and Baumann, 2006; 
Flannery and Rangan, 2008). 
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Equation (3) defines VE,t as a call option on the market value of the bank’s total assets, where 
 is the cumulative normal distribution,  is total liabilities,  
and . Equation (3) is the optimal hedge equation that relates the standard deviation of 
daily equity returns in a given year to the standard deviation of daily asset returns (both expressed on 
an annualized basis with T=1).  
To solve this system of equations and to extract  for each bank at yearly intervals, we 
employ as starting values for  the historical annualized yearly standard deviation of equity returns 
multiplied by the ratio of the market value of equity to the sum of the market value of equity and the 
book value of total liabilities, i.e. . Finally, a Newton search algorithm 
identifies the yearly values for VA.t and  in an iterative process. The resulting portfolio risk 
measure ( ) is expressed in percentage terms and shows a positive correlation with the regulatory 
risk assessment (RWATA). Over the full sample period, the correlation is 26.7 percent (significantly 
different from zero). 
Table 2 presents univariate tests on the relationship between the risk assessment underlying 
regulatory capital requirements and the market measure of portfolio risk ( ). Panel A presents the 
mean and median values of RWATA by different levels of asset volatility. We distinguish between 
banks with a low portfolio risk (where asset volatility is below the median of the sample distribution) 
and banks with a high portfolio risk (where asset volatility is above the median of the sample 
distribution). Two main findings become obvious. First, the two groups differ markedly in terms of 
the market assessment of the riskiness of their asset portfolios. Average asset volatility in the high-
volatility group is 6.2 percent, which is almost three times higher than the average asset volatility of 
2.1 percent reported for low-volatility banks (mean and median differences are statistically significant 
at 1 percent according to a t-test and z-test respectively). Second, when we compare the regulatory 
risk exposure based on capital requirements across the two groups, we find that the average RWATA 
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in high-volatility banks is higher than in low-volatility banks (69.9 percent compared to 60.1 percent; 
the difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level). 
*******TABLE 2 HERE****** 
However, it would be misleading to infer from the finding that banks with higher asset 
volatility hold more RWA, that RWATA are related to asset volatility in a meaningful way. Under the 
assumption that the minimum regulatory capital ratio is fixed at 8 percent of RWA, an increase in 
RWATA of nearly 10 percentage points (i.e. the difference in RWATA between banks with low and 
high portfolio risk) causes regulatory capital to increase by less than 0.8 percentage points. In other 
words, banks that triple their asset volatility are required to hold less than 0.8 percentage points of 
additional capital in order to comply with risk-based capital regulations. Evidently, regulatory capital 
requirements are very weakly related to bank portfolio risk.‡‡‡ 
During 2007–2010, our sample includes banks that report RWA based on either Basel I or 
Basel II.
§§§
 We inspect banks’ annual reports to identify the capital regime under which banks report 
RWA in each bank-year observation. Panel B of Table 2 reports RWA for low- and high-risk 
portfolios for banks under Basel I and Basel II from 2007–2010. The results show that while highly 
volatile portfolios are associated with higher values of RWA under both capital regimes (significant at 
                                                       
‡‡‡
 In fact, so low is the risk sensitivity of capital requirements during the sample period that even under the 
proposed Basel III revisions which are designed to be more risk-sensitive than previous capital adequacy 
regimes, our overall conclusion of weak risk sensitivity is unlikely to be significantly affected. The Basel 
Committee (2011) estimates Basel III is expected to increase RWA by 23 percent for the average large bank. 
Therefore, it appears unlikely that under Basel III, banks that move from a low- to a high-risk portfolio will face 
increases in regulatory capital requirements which are aligned with the riskiness of their assets. 
§§§ 
Most banks in our sample, which have adopted Basel II, did so in 2007. However, there are some noticeable 
exceptions. Some Japanese banks adopted Basel II in 2006 and some banks in Kuwait adopted Basel II as early 
as 2005.  
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the 1 percent level), any increases in capital requirements as banks move from low- to high-risk 
portfolios remain marginal.  
Panel B of Table 2 also offers some indications that the risk sensitivity of capital requirements 
differs across bank capital regimes. First, banks face higher increases in minimum capital 
requirements under Basel II than Basel I if they move from low- to high-risk portfolios (the average 
increase is 0.85 percent under Basel II compared with 0.47 percent under Basel I; difference 
significant at the 1 percent level). Second, banks report lower values of RWATA (statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level) under Basel II than Basel I especially when banks hold low-risk 
portfolios. The latter finding is consistent with a cross-country Quantitative Impact Study conducted 
by the Basel Committee (2006b), which predicts a decrease in minimum capital requirements for 
banks adopting Basel II relative to Basel I for a given level of portfolio risk.  
The results in Table 2 can only be seen as preliminary and as motivating additional analyses. 
This is because the proportion of RWA to total assets depends on several bank and environmental 
factors such as the composition of a bank’s asset portfolio (e.g. the volume of RWA is a function of 
credit risk exposure). We discuss these and other factors in the next subsection, which develops an 
informal model of the various factors which may affect the sensitivity of capital requirements to the 
asset volatility of banking firms.  
4.2 ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
This section describes the baseline specification that we employ to estimate the relationship between 
RWATA and asset volatility as well as a set of control variables. To study the sensitivity of regulatory 
capital requirements to the market assessment of a bank portfolio risk exposure, we employ the 
following baseline model:  
  (5) 
where RWATA are risk-weighted assets scaled by total assets, asset volatility is the volatility of bank 
assets (see Section 4.1) and CONTROLS is a vector of control variables which includes bank, country 
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characteristics and time dummies. The key coefficient for our analysis is  which represents the first 
derivative of RWATA with respect to asset volatility. Thus, captures the sensitivity of RWATA to 
changes in our market measure of portfolio risk.  
Equation (5) suffers from potential endogeneity of several right-hand side variables. 
Endogeneity concerns are particularly pressing considering that the market assessment of a bank’s 
portfolio risk (asset volatility) may in part be determined by the regulatory assessment of portfolio 
risk (as embodied in RWATA). For instance, persistent growth in RWATA may cause market 
investors to upwardly adjust their assessment of a bank’s portfolio risk. Likewise, there are 
endogeneity issues amongst some of the explanatory variables. For instance, it is well-documented 
that banks adjust capital buffers and risk weighted assets  simultaneously (Shrieves and Dahl, 1992; 
Rime, 2001). 
The system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Blundell and 
Bond (1998) is suited to deal with endogeneity issues by means of appropriate instruments. This is 
achieved by combining the moment conditions from the first-differenced and the levels equations.**** 
To choose the appropriate instruments, we follow an identification strategy similar to Delis and 
Staikouras (2011). Specifically, instruments are chosen with two objectives in mind.  
The first objective is that one set of instruments needs to comply with the identification of the 
GMM estimation method. We achieve this by exploiting the first lag difference of bank characteristics 
as instruments in the level equation and second and third lags of bank characteristics as instruments in 
                                                       
****
 The Blundell and Bond (1998) system estimator we employ has two advantages over other dynamic panel 
data methods, most notably, the difference-in-difference estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). First, 
as long as the instruments are valid, the GMM estimator exhibits higher levels of both consistency and 
efficiency. Second, unlike the difference estimator, the system GMM estimator permits the use of time-invariant 
(or highly persistent) variables in our specifications. This will be particularly useful when we estimate the 
impact of the Basel II Accord or regulatory characteristics (both show little variation over time) on the risk 
sensitivity of regulatory capital requirements. 
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the difference equation. This approach means that we treat all bank characteristics as endogenous 
covariates, while treating the country and macro controls as strictly exogenous. 
We verify that the instruments are statistically valid using a Hansen J test of over-identifying 
restrictions. Equally, it is economically valid to instrument asset volatility using ∆asset volatilityt-1 (in 
the level equation), and asset volatilityt-2 and asset volatilityt-3 (in the difference equation). ∆asset 
volatilityt-1 can be understood as reflecting changes in the economic environment. In the level 
equation, ∆asset volatilityt-1 therefore affects the contemporaneous level of asset volatility, but not 
RWATA.†††† By the same token, changes in RWATA react slowly to changes in the market 
assessment of portfolio risk in the difference equation.‡‡‡‡ The slow response of RWATA to changes 
in the economic environment could be due to two main reasons. First, the risk weighting embedded in 
the Basel Framework (especially under Basel I and the standardized approach) is based on fixed 
weights that do not vary over the business cycle. Second, banks can engage in capital arbitrage by 
lowering the reported value of RWATA relative to their portfolio risk, thus reducing the link between 
RWATA and economic fundamentals. 
The second objective when choosing instruments is to identify two additional instruments that 
are correlated with asset volatility but not with RWATA. Given the slow response of RWATA to the 
business cycle, this is achieved by using the level (first difference) of two country-level variables as 
instruments in the level (difference) equation: (i) the volatility of the annualized daily yield on one-
                                                       
††††
 The correlation between ∆asset volatilityt-1 and asset volatility (RWATA) is 0.22 (-0.04). Further, in the 
difference equation, changes in RWATA respond slowly to changes in the market assessment of portfolio risk as 
indicated by low correlations between ∆RWA and asset volatilityt-2 (r=0.06) and ∆RWATA and asset volatilityt-3 
(r=0.12). 
‡‡‡‡
 These instruments show a much higher (negative) correlation with ∆asset volatility at -0.34 and -0.18 
respectively. The change in asset volatility is more correlated with closer lags. Further, the correlation is 
negative suggesting banks that are perceived as riskier by the market tend to reduce their risk exposure in future 
years, possibly in an effort to preserve their competitive position. 
 17 
year government bonds, computed during the preceding quarter, and (ii) the yearly volatility of the 
domestic stock market (based on local Datastream market indices). Flannery and Rangan (2008) use a 
similar set of instruments and argue that these variables capture the external economic conditions that 
shape the market perceptions of bank portfolio risk. The validity of the additional instruments can be 
confirmed with reference to correlations. Both the government bond yields and stock market volatility 
correlate highly with asset volatility (the correlation coefficients, r, are 0.30 and 0.39 respectively), 
but not with RWATA (r=0.03 and r=-0.08).  
The vector CONTROL in Equation (5) includes bank-specific variables and country 
characteristics. We discuss both of these groups of variables in the following two subsections.  
Finally, system GMM specifications may be estimated either via a one-step or a two-step 
approach. While the one-step estimation produces unbiased standard errors, it is not asymptotically 
efficient in the estimation of the coefficients. The asymptotically more efficient two-step estimator, on 
the other hand, tends to bias the estimated standard errors downwards (Blundell and Bond, 1998). In 
this study, we employ the asymptotically efficient two-step GMM system and use the Windemeijer 
(2005) procedure to lower the bias and correct the standard errors. 
4.2.a Bank-Specific Controls 
We include a number of bank-specific control variables. The effect of these variables on RWATA 
may be due to two reasons. The variables either capture bank incentives to circumvent capital 
requirements via capital arbitrage (when capital regulations permit banks to underreport the riskiness 
of their portfolios), or alternatively the variables capture differences in the regulatory treatment of 
banks’ activities (essentially, because the risk weights linked to different bank assets vary).  
A first set of variables describes a bank’s opportunities and incentives to affect the risk-
weighted assets they report by means of capital arbitrage. First, we control for bank size using the log 
of total assets (in thousands of U.S. dollars). We hold no expectations regarding the effect of bank 
size on RWATA. On the one hand, large banks may report lower values of RWATA as they may 
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attract a lower regulatory risk assessment of their asset portfolios owing to their ability to engage in 
capital arbitrage. On the other hand, large banks might be subject to closer regulatory scrutiny due to 
the negative systemic externalities produced by their failure. As a result, larger banks may find it 
more difficult to engage in regulatory arbitrage meaning that larger banks display higher values of 
RWATA for a given level of asset volatility. We also control for bank profitability via return on assets 
(ROA; defined as net income over total assets). We expect to find a positive relationship between 
ROA and RWATA, because more profitable banks face fewer incentives to understate the value of 
risky assets and to engage in regulatory arbitrage more generally. 
We also control for the percentage capital buffer (the difference between a bank’s regulatory 
capital ratio and the regulatory minimum). We expect that, after controlling for the level of asset 
volatility, capital buffers exert a negative effect on RWATA. A negative coefficient on capital buffers 
is consistent with the view that as capital buffers increase, banks are more prone to engage in capital 
arbitrage, partly because highly-capitalized banks tend to receive lower levels of regulatory scrutiny 
(Calem and Rob, 1999). Therefore, we expect higher capital buffers to be associated with lower 
RWATA as highly-capitalized banks are in a better position to shift more of their activities outside the 
scrutiny of the Basel Accord. 
We control for bank funding using the ratio of total deposits to total liabilities. We expect a 
positive relationship between deposits and RWATA because deposits pose a relatively stable and 
cheap form of funding to banks. Banks with a larger deposit base are, therefore, more likely to be 
accepting of the higher regulatory capital requirements which result from higher values of RWATA 
and less likely to engage in capital arbitrage.  
 A second set of variables captures differences in the regulatory treatment of bank activities on 
RWATA. For instance, we control for a bank’s asset composition by including the ratio of net 
customer loans to total assets. Under the Basel guidelines, the risk weights assigned to customer loans 
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are higher than those applied to other forms of lending such as interbank lending.§§§§ As a result, we 
expect that banks with a higher share of loans in their asset portfolio show higher values of RWATA. 
By the same token, we control for fee-based activities via the proportion of non-interest income in 
total operating income. Since higher values of this ratio indicate that banks engage in more non-
lending or off-balance sheet activities, we expect that non-interest income attracts lower regulatory 
risk weights (and enters with a negative sign).***** 
******TABLE 3 HERE****** 
Finally, to account for differences in the capital adequacy rules followed by banks, we 
introduce three bank-level indicators to capture if and how banks report RWATA under the Basel II 
guidelines. These indictors are constructed by inspecting the annual reports of sample banks to 
determine which of our sample banks have adopted Basel II††††† (and which banks continue to report 
RWATA according to Basel I). The first indicator is a simple binary variable which equals 1 if a bank 
has adopted Basel II in a given year and 0 otherwise. In a Quantitative Impact Study based on 29 
countries, the Basel Committee (2006b) reports that banks that have adopted Basel II have seen 
minimum capital requirements decrease relative to Basel I for a given level of portfolio risk. We 
therefore expect that Basel II exerts a negative effect on the risk assessment underlying capital 
regulations.  
                                                       
§§§§
 The correlation between RWATA and loans in our sample is 51 percent indicating that, while loans are an 
important component of RWATA, the two variables capture different aspects. Unlike loans, RWATA captures 
the riskiness of a bank’s lending book (by applying different risk weights to different types of loans) and, 
depending on the capital regime in place, also some off-balance sheet assets. A complete correlation matrix is 
available from the authors upon request. 
*****
 While both loans and non-interest income capture bank business models, they are not highly correlated in 
our sample (r= 0.386).  
†††††
 Overall, there are 401 observations in our sample where the value of risk-weighted assets has been 
computed on the basis of Basel II. 
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The other two Basel II indicators control for differences in the approaches banks employ to 
calculate their risk exposure under Basel II. We construct two binary variables which indicate if a 
bank has adopted the internal rating-based approach (IRB) or the standardized approach in a given 
year. Banks may either adopt the standardized approach (with a more granular regulatory definition of 
risk weights and the external use of ratings for rated borrowers, but no changes for loans to unrated 
borrowers) or, alternatively, the internal ratings-based approach. The IRB approach relies on a bank’s 
internal risk measures of credit risk to determine regulatory capital requirements. Under the IRB 
approach, which is believed to be the most risk-sensitive of the Basel II approaches (Basel 
Committee, 2006b; Hakenes and Schnabel, 2011), banks estimate credit risk based on model 
estimates of the probability of default using their internal data. These estimates will then serve as 
inputs for the risk weighting function specified by the Basel Accord. Repullo and Suarez (2004) and 
Hakenes and Schnabel (2011) argue that the relatively more advantageous treatment of low-risk 
lending under the IRB approach means that banks with low-risk loans are more likely to adopt the 
IRB approach. We therefore expect IRB to exert a negative effect on RWATA. 
4.2.b Country-Specific Controls  
The final group of controls refers to country characteristics. First we control for the size of the shadow 
banking sector by calculating the value of outstanding securitized assets scaled by GDP. Following an 
aggregation method described in IMF (2009), we obtain data on the issue date, value and maturity 
date of all asset-backed securities (ABS) and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) from the SDC New 
Issues database. Where maturity dates are missing (this affects two percent of all issues), we assume a 
maturity of thirty years. Values are aggregated as the total principal amount of the entire transaction 
(across various tranches). We use the data to calculate the sum of all outstanding issues at the end of 
each calendar year and divide this amount by total GDP.  
We expect the size of the shadow banking sector to reduce the proportion of RWATA on a 
bank’s balance sheet. A larger shadow banking system should offer more opportunities for banks to 
engage in capital arbitrage and to move credit risk exposure out of the reach of capital adequacy 
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regulations. For instance, Acharya and Richardson (2009) argue that under the Basel rules it is more 
advantageous for U.S. banks to transform loans into highly-rated bonds via securitization and to hold 
on to these securitized assets than to hold on to the underlying loans. On the other hand, if banks face 
more opportunities to offload credit risk under capital adequacy rules when the shadow banking 
system is large, it is conceivable that banks invest in loans which attract higher regulatory risk-weight. 
Consistent with this, Vo and Le (2011) show that following securitization issues, U.S. banks invest in 
riskier loans and experience a subsequent increase in RWATA. If larger shadow banking systems lead 
to banks assuming additional credit risk in their loan portfolios, we expect to find a positive 
relationship between the scale of shadow banking and RWATA. 
Further, regulatory practices and the disciplinary powers at the disposal of regulators may 
also impact upon banks’ incentives to undertake regulatory capital arbitrage. We rely on the Barth, 
Caprio and Levine (2004) database‡‡‡‡‡ to construct two measures which capture the stringency of 
capital requirements and the availability of regulatory powers to enforce these. First, we use an index 
of capital regulation as used in Laeven and Levine (2009) to describe the regulatory approaches to 
assessing and verifying the amount of capital at risk in a bank.§§§§§ Second, we expect that in 
regulatory environments in which stricter capital stringency and more regulatory powers prevail, 
banks will have fewer opportunities to engage in capital arbitrage to understate the value of their 
                                                       
‡‡‡‡‡
 Updated values are available from the World Bank website, http://go.worldbank.org/SNUSW978P0. 
§§§§§
 The index values are based on the following questions (yes = 1; no = 0). (1) Is the minimum capital asset 
requirement risk weighted in line with the Basel guidelines? (2) Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of 
market risk? (3) Are market value of loan losses not realized in accounting books deducted from capital? (4) Are 
unrealized losses in securities portfolios deducted? (5) Are unrealized foreign exchange losses deducted? (6) 
What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part of capital? (7) Are the sources of funds to be used as capital 
verified by regulatory or supervisory authorities? (8) Can the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of 
capital be done with assets other than cash or government securities? (9) Can the initial disbursement be done 
with borrowed funds? We construct the index such that we use the last available year for which data are 
available for each year. 
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RWATA for a given level of portfolio risk. Hence, we expect to observe a positive relationship 
between RWATA and the regulatory variables. 
Finally, in some specifications, we control for the business cycle (expressed by the real GDP 
growth rate in U.S. dollars). Several papers emphasize the procyclical effects of risk-based capital 
regulation especially in the context of Basel II (see Repullo and Suarez, 2004; Feess and, 2011). 
Under procyclicality, we expect regulatory measures of credit risk to increase during an economic 
downturn. Therefore, we expect to find a negative relationship between GDP growth and RWATA.  
Table 3 offers an overview and selected summary of statistics of the variables employed in 
the empirical analysis. 
5. Empirical Results: The Market Assessment of Portfolio Risk  
and Capital Requirements 
In this section, we analyze our main research question. We examine whether changes in the market 
assessment of bank portfolio risk lead to changes in the regulatory assessment of bank risk 
(RWATA), which determines minimum capital requirements. Table 4 reports the regression results of 
the baseline model on the relationship between asset volatility and RWATA using a dynamic GMM 
estimator. 
*******TABLE 4 HERE****** 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the estimation results for different model specifications. In Column 
1, we employ a parsimonious model which includes only basic firm characteristics and regulatory 
control variables. Next, in Column 2 we remove the regulatory characteristics and include additional 
firm characteristics. We then estimate the model control for the full range of bank characteristics and 
regulatory controls (Column 3), with the addition of the GDP growth rate (Column 4), and the 
variables indicating whether the IRB or standardized approach has been adopted (Columns 5–9). In all 
specifications, the coefficients assigned to asset volatility enter with a positive and significant 
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coefficient (at the 1 percent level) indicating a positive association between regulatory risk assessment 
(RWATA) and market assessment of portfolio risk.******  
Panel B of Table 4 estimates the additional capital requirements per unit of assets linked to 
increases in asset volatility (based on 1 percent and 5 percent increases in asset volatility). The results 
show that even substantial increases in the market assessment of bank portfolio risk cause only small 
increases in capital requirements. Depending on the model specification, a five-percentage point 
increase in portfolio risk (which in our sample distribution corresponds to approximately a 1.5 
standard deviation increase in asset volatility) leads to additional capital holdings of between 0.171 
and 0.189 percentage points. This confirms the results of the univariate analysis presented in Table 2, 
which also shows that the relationship between RWATA and asset volatility is very weak in economic 
terms. Jointly, these results raise doubts over the ability of bank capital regulation to capture the 
market perception of portfolio risk in an economically meaningful way.  
In terms of the control variables, we observe that RWATA increases in loans (significant at 
10 percent). This confirms that a bank’s lending activities attract high regulatory risk weights under 
Basel rules on capital adequacy. Furthermore, RWATA is positively associated with both ROA and 
deposits (at the 1 percent level). These findings are consistent with the notion that both higher 
profitability and more deposit-based funding reduce a bank’s incentives to engage in capital arbitrage 
by reporting lower values of RWATA. Further, for a given level of asset volatility, increases in capital 
buffers are negatively related to RWATA (significant at 1 percent). Consequently, banks with higher 
capital buffers exhibit a lower risk exposure based on capital adequacy rules. The negative coefficient 
on capital buffers pinpoints to deficiencies in the regulatory risk assessment, because it suggests that 
capital regulations permit banks to boost capital by letting them underreport their portfolio risk when 
                                                       
******
 Overall, the results we report confirm the validity of adopting a system GMM estimator. First, the lagged 
values on RWATA enter the regression analysis consistently with a positive and highly significant coefficient. 
Second, both the m2 and the Hansen J-statistic are insignificant. This confirms, respectively, that there is no 
second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals and that our instruments are valid. 
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they hold regulatory capital above minimum requirements. We will revert to this issue in Section 7 
where we examine whether the risk sensitivity of minimum capital requirements varies with the level 
of capital buffers which banks maintain.  
As regards country characteristics, our findings suggest that RWATA is higher when banks 
operate in countries with a larger shadow banking system and in more stringent regulatory regimes 
(both the capital regulation and the regulatory strength index enter significantly and with a positive 
sign). The former result is consistent with banks engaging in riskier activities under capital adequacy 
rules when the shadow banking sector is large and when banks boast more opportunities to offload 
credit risk into the shadow banking system (see Vo and Le, 2011). The latter result is consistent with 
more stringent regulatory environments preventing banks from engaging in capital arbitrage. Finally, 
the results do not provide clear evidence on whether the adoption of Basel II affects RWATA, 
although we find a significant decline in RWATA for banks that have opted for the IRB approach in 
Columns 5 and 7 to 9.  
6. Basel II, Capital Requirements and the Market Assessment of Portfolio 
Risk 
This section analyzes whether the introduction of Basel II has modified the relationship between 
RWATA and asset volatility. The primary mechanisms by which Basel II seeks to enhance the 
sensitivity of capital requirements to bank portfolio risk is the introduction of more granular risk 
weights to calculate RWATA as well as the acceptance of internally developed credit risk models by 
regulators for eligible banks. Basel II therefore abandons the one-size-fits-all approach in terms of 
determining a bank’s risk exposure and gives some banks the right to choose between different risk 
aggregation methods (the standardized or IRB approach). If Basel II is effective in improving the 
sensitivity of capital requirements with respect to portfolio risk, it should curb bank incentives for 
capital arbitrage and lead to a convergence in the regulatory and market assessment of banks’ 
portfolio risk.  
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Furthermore, we expect that the moderating effect of Basel II on the risk sensitivity of capital 
requirements varies with the type of risk weighting approach which banks adopt. Repullo and Suarez 
(2004) and Hakenes and Schnabel (2011) argue that banks eligible for the IRB approach are likely to 
focus on low-risk lending (because the more risk-sensitive IRB approach leads to lower capital 
requirements for these banks), while banks not eligible for the IRB approach are likely to focus on 
high-risk lending (because the standardized approach leads to lower capital requirements for risky 
banks). Evidently, it will be more advantageous for banks that employ the standardized approach to 
engage in capital arbitrage than for banks that employ the more risk-sensitive IRB approach.  
*******TABLE 5 HERE****** 
To test whether Basel II has modified the relationship between RWATA and asset volatility, 
we introduce interaction terms between asset volatility and the Basel II dummies. To avoid 
multicollinearity between the interaction terms and their constituent variables, we mean-center asset 
volatility before adding it to the regression models. Mean-centering, which involves transforming the 
values of asset volatility into deviations from their mean, also eases the interpretation of the results. 
The coefficient of Basel II can be interpreted as capturing the effect of this capital regime for a bank 
with an average value of asset volatility (namely, when the interaction term is equal to zero). Further, 
significantly positive coefficients on the Basel interaction terms indicate that increases in asset 
volatility are associated with a higher value of RWATA (and, thus, higher capital requirements) under 
Basel II than under the Basel I rules. While we expect that both the IRB and the standardized 
approach to improve the risk sensitivity of capital requirements, we also expect that the moderating 
effect of IRB on RWATA will be of a higher magnitude. 
The results in Panel A of Table 5 suggest that Basel II has improved the risk sensitivity of 
regulatory capital requirements, as indicated by a significant interaction term between Basel II and 
asset volatility, especially in banks that have adopted the IRB approach as demonstrated by the results 
from Columns 3 to 8. However, when we compute the additional capital requirements which result 
from changes in asset volatility under Basel II, the results indicate that, similar to Basel I, increases in 
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portfolio risk under Basel II have a near negligible impact on capital requirements. Even when the 
minimum capital ratio equals 13 percent, an increase in asset volatility of five-percentage points (the 
equivalent of a 1.5 standard deviation increase in the sample distribution of asset volatility) under the 
IRB approach translates into additional capital requirements of only 0.70 p.p. per unit of assets. 
Panel B of Table 5 explores whether the impact of Basel II on the relationship between risk 
and capital requirements depends on how risky a bank’s asset portfolio is. Panel B reports changes in 
RWATA when banks that adopt Basel II display asset portfolios which can be classified as either low 
risk (asset volatility=1 percent) or high risk (asset volatility=5 percent). We compute the minimum 
capital requirements which result when low-risk and high-risk portfolios are assessed under Basel II 
(assuming capital requirements are 8 percent of risk-weighted assets). The results show that banks 
with low-volatility portfolios hold significantly lower RWATA (and, thus, benefit from lower capital 
requirements) when adopting Basel II. By contrast, banks with high- volatility portfolios do not 
increase RWATA when adopting Basel II. This result is driven by banks adopting the IRB approach. 
Consequently, the increased risk sensitivity of capital requirements under the IRB approach is highly 
asymmetric. For low-volatility portfolios, capital adequacy requirements are lower, but the equivalent 
is not true for banks with high-volatility portfolios which do not see an increase in RWATA. We 
therefore conclude that the adoption of the IRB approach under Basel II rewards banks with less risky 
asset portfolios without penalizing banks with highly risky asset portfolios.  
In summary, we show that Basel II is marginally more risk-sensitive than its predecessor. 
However, the increase in risk sensitivity only applies to banks with low-risk portfolios that adopt the 
IRB approach. High-risk institutions and institutions adopting the standardized approach do not 
experience an increased risk sensitivity of capital requirements.  
7. Capital Buffers, Capital Requirements and the Market Assessment of 
Portfolio Risk 
We next examine whether the risk sensitivity of capital requirements varies across banks depending 
on the amount of capital which banks hold above minimum regulatory requirements. It is a widely-
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documented empirical fact that banks hold capital above minimum regulatory requirements (e.g., 
Brewer, Kaufman and Wall, 2008; Flannery and Rangan, 2008; Gropp and Heider, 2010). In our 
sample, the mean (median) buffer above capital requirements is 4.56 percent (3.90 percent) between 
2000 and 2007 and slightly higher if we consider the full sample period (4.88 percent and 4.22 percent 
respectively). The higher capital buffers over the entire sample period are probably due to the 
recapitalization efforts undertaken by banks during the financial crisis.  
Given that capital requirements are weakly related to our market measure of the portfolio risk 
of banks, this leaves two explanations for why banks maintain buffers. Both explanations have 
implications for the risk sensitivity of capital requirements. First, banks may boost their capital 
buffers via arbitrage, essentially because capital regulations permit them to underreport the portfolio 
risks they undertake. According to this explanation, banks may lower risk-weighted assets while 
maintaining a constant proportion of excess capital to total assets on their balance sheet. This can be 
demonstrated when we decompose a bank’s capital buffer as follows: 
 (5) 
Second, if buffers are not due to capital arbitrage, they may be the result of banks with riskier 
asset portfolios maintaining larger buffers. These larger buffers would then serve as a cushion against 
an increased probability that adverse shocks cause capital to fall below the minimum regulatory 
capital ratio. If this is the case, we expect buffers to interact with portfolio risk in shaping the value of 
RWA which banks report.  
*******TABLE 6 HERE****** 
In this section, we test which explanation prevails (that is, are buffers the product of capital 
arbitrage or, alternatively, higher capital holdings against riskier bank portfolios?) by examining 
whether the risk sensitivity of capital requirements differs by the size of capital buffers that banks 
maintain. As previously, we mean-center asset volatility and buffer before multiplying the adjusted 
variables to produce an interaction term between asset volatility and buffer, which we add to the 
 28 
baseline specification. Initially, we focus on the period prior to the financial crisis before we extend 
the analysis to include the entire sample period. This allows us to isolate the potential impact of bank 
recapitalization strategies (including the effects of governments providing capital assistance [e.g., 
CPP in the U.S.]). Therefore, differences in our findings between the two time periods provide an 
indication of how any crisis-related recapitalization strategies have influenced the link between 
RWATA, asset volatility and buffer.  
*******TABLE 7 HERE****** 
The findings for the pre-crisis period (2000–2007; reported in the first four columns of Panel 
A of Table 6) show that there is no evidence that the risk sensitivity of capital requirements changes 
as capital buffers increase. The interaction term between asset volatility and buffer is not significant at 
customary levels. However, we continue to observe that banks with higher capital buffers report lower 
RWATA before the crisis. This suggests that pre-2008 banks boost their regulatory capital ratios to 
levels above minimum requirements by exploiting deficiencies in the regulatory risk assessment 
underlying capital adequacy rules. Interestingly, this yields an explanation for why high regulatory 
capital ratios have been found to be unreliable signals of the capital strength of a bank (IMF, 2009; 
Allen et al., 2011). 
When we examine the full sample period, the interaction term between asset volatility and 
buffer enters with a negative sign (significant at the 1 percent level). Consequently, higher capital 
buffers are associated with a weaker relationship between RWATA and asset volatility. One 
explanation for this result is that marked increases in buffer during the crisis period are particularly 
pronounced for banks that were most engaged in capital arbitrage in the pre-crisis period. Put 
differently, the banks most involved in arbitrage pre-2008 saw rapid increases in their capital holdings 
during the crisis in order to bring capital levels more in line with the economic risk of their asset 
portfolios. 
We offer some support for this conjecture in Table 7 where we gauge whether capital 
arbitrage in the run-up to the financial crisis can be linked to government-aided recapitalizations 
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during the financial crisis. We identify banks that increased their capital buffers markedly during the 
recent crisis in 2008–2009 (defined as banks located in the top quartile of the annual distribution of 
capital increases, namely 2.10 percent per annum on average) and build two binary variables for this 
group. The first variable takes a value of 1 for banks when some or all of the recapitalization is 
government-funded (usually when governments purchase participation capital in a bank).†††††† The 
second variable takes a value of 1 for recapitalizations via bank funding markets. We introduce these 
two binary variables along with their interactions with mean-centered asset volatility (between 2000 
and 2007) to the model specifications reported in Panel A of Table 7. 
The results show that the interaction term between asset volatility and government 
recapitalizations enters all specifications with a negative and significant coefficient. Accordingly, the 
pre-crisis risk sensitivity of capital requirements at banks that engaged in large recapitalizations 
during the financial crisis that were at least in part financed by governments was significantly lower 
than that of the rest of the sample. Furthermore, as reported in Panel B, the risk sensitivity of capital 
requirements of these ‘bailed-out’ banks (the sum of the coefficients on asset volatility and asset 
volatility*government recapitalization) is not significantly different from zero in most specifications. 
By contrast, banks that increase their regulatory capital ratios during the crisis without government 
support display a risk sensitivity which is not significantly different from the rest of the sample.  
In summary, the results of this section provide additional evidence that the risk assessment 
underlying the Basel capital rules does not sufficiently reflect the actual risk of bank portfolios. On 
the contrary, before the financial crisis, banks with larger buffers report lower values of RWATA for 
a given level of portfolio risk. While the risk sensitivity of capital requirements of well capitalized 
banks are not significantly different from those of less well capitalized banks before 2008, we observe 
a negative link between buffer and the risk sensitivity of capital requirements when the full sample 
                                                       
†††††† We collect data on government-funded recapitalizations from ProPublica 
(http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list) for U.S. banks, Petrovic and Tutsch (2009) for European banks, and 
annual reports as well as bank websites for the remainder of the sample. 
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period is considered. We argue that the latter result is due to the effect of bank recapitalization 
strategies during 2008 and 2009, which were disproportionately undertaken by banks characterized by 
the weakest risk sensitivity of capital requirements in the run-up to the financial crisis due to 
regulatory capital arbitrage. In line with this argument, we show that before 2008 banks that boosted 
their regulatory capital ratio during the crisis partly via government-aided recapitalization programs 
did not exhibit any measurable risk sensitivity in the capital requirements. 
8. Additional Analysis 
We perform additional tests that examine whether our results are robust to changes in the 
econometric techniques used, our market measure of risk or the composition of the sample. None of 
the changes outlined below cause us to observe material changes to the results reported in the 
previous sections. We report the results of these additional tests in full in the online appendix to this 
paper. 
First, we assess the sensitivity of our results to an alternative econometric specification which 
does not rely on a dynamic GMM estimator, but uses a relatively simple and static two-stage least 
squares instrumental variable (2SLS-IV) model with macro variables as instruments for asset 
volatility. While the coefficient on asset volatility is somewhat higher, it remains economically weak 
and therefore in line with the previous results we report. Second, we follow Flannery and Rangan 
(2008) and we employ an alternative risk measure defined as the unlevered bank equity volatility 
(equity volatility multiplied by the ratio of the market value of equity to the quasi-market value of 
bank total assets). Third we run estimations only for banks that report risk-weighted assets under 
Basel I. Fourth, we sequentially exclude U.S. banks, banks based in developing countries, banks 
based in countries with only a single bank in the sample, and all observations after 2007 (to rule out 
explanations that the financial crisis has affected the results we report). Fifth, we include additional 
macro controls such as interest rates (e.g., banks may face incentives to take on additional risk in a 
low interest rate environment, see Delis and Kouretas, 2011) and the value of domestic credit relative 
to the size of the economy. 
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Finally, we examine whether the size of the shadow banking sector affects the relationship 
between asset volatility and RWATA. If securitization lowers capital requirements without a 
commensurate transfer in asset risk (Merton, 1995; Jones, 2000), a larger shadow banking sector will 
widen discrepancies between the regulatory and market indicators of portfolio risk. We mean-center 
asset volatility and the shadow banking variable and add an interaction term based on the 
multiplication of the two mean-centered variables to the baseline specification. The results show that 
the interaction terms between securitization and asset volatility enter the regression models with the 
expected negative coefficient (significant below the 5 percent level) while asset volatility continues to 
enter significantly. Thus, the larger the size of the shadow banking system in a country, the lower the 
sensitivity of capital requirements with respect to portfolio risk.  
9. Conclusions 
We examine if the minimum regulatory capital requirements as stipulated by the Basel Accord are 
sensitive to a market measure of the portfolio risk of banks. Based on an international sample of banks 
between 2000 and 2010, we assess to what extent increases in bank portfolio risk, measured in terms 
of asset volatility, affect the volume of risk-weighted assets (RWA) which determines the minimum 
amount of capital banks are required to hold against their asset portfolios.  
The effectiveness of risk-based capital requirements is based on the extent to which the 
regulatory definition of each bank’s risk exposure is an accurate reflection of bank portfolio risk. If 
regulatory capital requirements are ill-calibrated to portfolio risk, capital regulation will incentivize 
banks to invest in assets which attract a low risk-weighting even if these assets are highly risky. If the 
risk sensitivity of capital requirements is low, banks with riskier asset portfolios will not be subject to 
sufficiently higher capital requirements than banks with less risky portfolios. 
Our results show that the calibration of regulatory capital requirements to portfolio risk is 
very weak. The adoption of Basel II has only marginally increased the risk sensitivity of capital 
requirements and has introduced an asymmetric treatment of low-risk portfolios (which lower 
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regulatory requirements as banks adopt the IRB approach) and high-risk portfolios (for which banks 
do not face additional capital requirements under IRB). Further, before 2008 banks with larger buffers 
report lower values of risk-weighted assets over total assets for a given level of asset volatility 
suggesting that Basel has allowed banks to underreport the risk of their asset portfolios in the run-up 
to the financial crisis. In line with this argument, we also show that banks that substantially boosted 
their regulatory capital ratio during the crisis period via recapitalizations programs that were in part 
government-financed displayed particularly risk-insensitive capital requirements before 2008. Finally, 
as the size of the shadow banking sector grows, the link between risk and capital requirements further 
weakens.  
Our analysis is not intended to suggest that it would be desirable if RWA were to exactly 
track our market measure of the volatility of bank assets. Asset volatility is affected by many factors 
external to bank management. Instead, our results uncover large discrepancies between the regulatory 
and the market perception of bank portfolio risk and demonstrate that this discrepancy has caused 
both a steady decline in the volume of risk-weighted assets and undermined the ability of banks to 
withstand large adverse shocks to the value of their asset portfolios. In other words, while our analysis 
does not allow us to identify the correct level of risk sensitivity, our results show that the existing risk 
sensitivity of capital requirements is clearly too low. 
Our results raise doubts over whether the type of revisions to capital requirements which are 
in the processes of being implemented will be sufficient to ensure that banks are required to hold 
capital in line with their portfolio risk. The Basel III revisions are designed to increase both the 
quantity and quality of minimum capital holdings by further enhancing the risk sensitivity of capital 
requirements. As regards increases in RWA relative to Basel II, the Basel Committee (2011, pg. 31) 
reports that ‘a 1.23 factor is a rough approximation based on the average increase in risk-weighted 
assets associated with the enhancements to risk coverage in Basel III relative to Basel II’. However, as 
long as the regulatory concept of risk exposure which underlies the computation of RWA remains 
only weakly related to risk, the type of increases in the percentage of capital requirements which are 
 33 
proposed are unlikely to align capital holdings with the effective riskiness of bank asset portfolios. 
More precisely, the risk sensitivity of capital requirements we report in this paper is of such a low 
magnitude that this questions whether Basel III will improve the relationship between capital 
requirements and risk in an economically meaningful way. The projected increase in RWA under 
Basel III suggests that, even under a minimum capital ratio of 13 percent, banks in our sample will 
only be required to hold, on average, 1.94 percent of additional capital per unit of assets. Such an 
increase is unlikely to cause minimum capital requirements to be more reflective of bank portfolio 
risk in an economically meaningful way. 
Our findings support a much more profound overhaul of capital adequacy rules than currently 
proposed. In line with our findings, Hellwig (2010) and Admati et al. (2010) call for an increase in 
capital requirements (based on unweighted assets) well into double-digit territory to improve the 
safety of the financial system. However, critics point out that the increasing cost of financial 
intermediation that could result from stricter capital requirements may cause a contraction in the level 
of debt-financed investment and consumption. Some evidence consistent with this view has been 
found following the introduction of the first Basel Accord (Peek and Rosengren, 1995; Chiuri, Ferri 
and Majnoni, 2002) and similar concerns have been voiced ahead of the Basel III revisions becoming 
effective (see Sironi, 2010). In contrast to this view, other work suggests that the costs which banks 
incur to comply with higher capital requirements may well be modest, because a bank’s overall 
funding costs are likely to decrease as bank leverage decreases (Hellwig, 2010, Miles et al, 2012). 
Nonetheless, concerns over bank lending mean that the phasing in of higher capital requirements will 
have to be carefully managed by policymakers and complemented by tight and efficient supervision 
that minimizes banks’ ability to game the system.  
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Table 1: Sample Distribution by Country and Year 
 Banks Observations 
 Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Country 
Australia 8 3.24 77 3.39 
Austria 5 2.02 49 2.16 
Belgium  2 0.81 22 0.97 
Brazil  2 0.81 14 0.62 
Canada 8 3.24 83 3.65 
China 2 0.81 15 0.66 
Colombia 1 0.40 7 0.31 
Denmark 4 1.62 44 1.94 
France 2 0.81 22 0.97 
Germany 4 1.62 31 1.36 
Greece 4 1.62 34 1.50 
Hong Kong 4 1.62 39 1.72 
Hungary 1 0.40 10 0.44 
India 2 0.81 16 0.70 
Ireland 3 1.21 28 1.23 
Israel 5 2.02 54 2.38 
Italy 6 2.43 57 2.51 
Japan 15 6.48 141 6.21 
Rep. of Korea 2 0.81 22 0.97 
Kuwait 2 0.81 12 0.53 
Liechtenstein  1 0.40 8 0.35 
Malaysia  6 2.43 56 2.46 
Mexico 1 0.40 6 0.26 
Netherlands 1 0.40 7 0.31 
Norway 2 0.81 14 0.62 
Pakistan 1 0.40 6 0.26 
Portugal 3 1.21 33 1.45 
Qatar  2 0.81 13 0.57 
Russia 1 0.40 6 0.26 
Saudi Arabia 6 2.43 46 2.02 
Singapore 3 1.21 33 1.45 
South Africa 3 1.21 26 1.14 
Spain  9 3.64 94 4.14 
Sweden 3 1.21 33 1.45 
Switzerland 3 1.21 31 1.36 
Taiwan 1 0.40 6 0.26 
Thailand  3 1.21 33 1.45 
Turkey 2 0.81 15 0.66 
United Arab Emirates 1 0.40 6 0.26 
United Kingdom  9 3.64 84 3.70 
USA 103 41.70 939 41.33 
Total  246 100.00 2,272 100.00 
Panel B: Sample Distribution by Year 
2000   178 7.83 
2001   195 8.58 
2002   207 9.11 
2003   219 9.64 
2004   229 10.08 
2005   236 10.39 
2006   226 9.95 
2007   214 9.42 
2008   198 8.71 
2009   190 8.36 
2010   180 7.92 
Total   
2,272 100.00 
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Table 2: Risk-Weighted Assets over Total Assets (RWATA) and the Market Assessment of Bank Portfolio Risk  
The table presents univariate tests. RWATA is risk-weighted assets (RWA) scaled by total assets. 
Asset volatility captures the market assessment of bank portfolio risk and is estimated using option 
pricing theory. Banks are classified as low and high portfolio risk relative to the sample median. t- (z-
)tests on the equality of mean (median) values of RWATA between high- and low-risk groups are 
reported. Minimum capital requirements are assumed to be 8 percent of RWA.  
 LOW  
asset 
volatility 
HIGH 
asset 
volatility 
(2) minus (1) 
Δ min capital 
requirements 
due to (3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Full Sample 
     
Mean asset volatility 2.1% 6.2%   
     
Mean RWATA 60.13 69.87 9.74*** 
(14.23) 
0.78% 
     
Median RWATA 60.12 70.82 10.70*** 
(14.46) 
0.86% 
N 1,136 1,136   
     
     
Panel B: Basel I vs. Basel II (2007–2010) 
     
Mean asset volatility 2.2% 7.2%   
     
Basel I     
Mean RWATA   (a) 67.00 72.83 5.83*** 0.47% 
   (3.863)  
Median RWATA (b) 66.91 73.98 7.07*** 0.57% 
N 144 259 (3.571)  
     
Basel II     
Mean RWATA    (c) 54.16 64.73 10.57*** 0.85% 
   (4.973)  
Median RWATA (d) 51.89 64.70 12.81*** 1.02% 
N 247 132 (5.663)  
     
Basel I vs. Basel II     
(a) minus (c) = 0 ? 12.84*** 
(6.190) 
8.10*** 
(5.157) 
  
     
(b) minus (d) = 0 ? 15.02*** 9.18***   
 (7.492) (4.737)   
     
*** significant at 1 percent. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
  N Mean Median St. Dev. 1 Pctile 99 Pctile 
RWATA Risk-weighted assets over total assets (percent) 2,272 65.00 65.79 17.02 18.99 103.41 
Asset volatility Market assessment of bank portfolio risk estimated via 
option pricing theory (percent)  
2,272 4.16 3.30 3.29 0.68 16.37 
Size Log of total assets in thousands of U.S. dollars 2,272 17.56 17.26 1.63 15.13 21.46 
ROA Net income over total assets (percent) 2,272 0.83 0.86 0.95 -3.00 3.07 
Buffer Bank regulatory capital ratio minus minimum required  
capital ratio (percent)  
2,272 4.88 4.22 3.23 0.30 16.80 
Deposits  Customer deposits over total liabilities (percent) 2,272 66.58 69.13 18.90 20.53 95.88 
Loans Net loans over total assets (percent) 2,272 60.84 61.91 13.45 21.77 90.41 
Non-interest income Non-interest income over total operating income (percent)  2,272 34.65 34.13 14.91 2.75 75.52 
Basel II  Dummy variable which equals 1 if a bank adopted the  
Basel II capital standards (and 0 otherwise) 
2,272 0.176 0.000 0.381 0.000 1.000 
IRB Dummy variable which equals 1 if a bank has adopted the  
internal ratings-based (IRB) approach (0 otherwise) 
2,272 0.092 0.000 0.288 0.000 1.000 
Standardized Dummy variable which equals 1 if a bank adopted the 
standardized approach (0 otherwise) 
2,272 0.086 0.000 0.280 0.000 1.000 
Shadow banking Total value of securitized assets over total GDP (percent) 2,272 36.32 37.92 16.46 0.00 97.56 
Capital regulation Yearly index which captures the regulatory approach to 
assessing and verifying the degree of capital at risk in a 
bank. The index ranges from 0 to 9 with higher values 
indicating increased strictness. From Barth et al. (2004) with 
updated values from the Worldbank website 
2,272 5.19 5.00 1.28 2.00 8.00 
Regulatory strength Yearly index which assesses general regulatory strength at 
country level. The index ranges from 0 to 10 with higher 
values indicating increased strictness. From Barth et al. 
(2004) with updated values from the Worldbank website 
2,272 8.12 9.00 1.44 4.00 10.00 
GDP growth  Real GDP growth rate in (U.S. dollars) 2,256 2.54 2.67 2.88 -5.33 9.82 
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Table 4: The Market Assessment of Bank Portfolio Risk and RWATA 
Panel A shows regression results on the ratio of risk- weighted assets to total assets (RWATA). The models are estimated via the two-step GMM estimator 
proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). Asset volatility captures the market assessment of bank portfolio risk and is measured as the value of asset volatility 
estimated via option pricing theory, Size is the log of total assets, ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets, Buffer is the percent difference between the 
regulatory capital ratio and the required capital ratio, Deposits is customer deposits over total liabilities, Loans is the ratio of net loans to total assets and 
Non-interest income  is the ratio of non-interest income to total operating income, Basel II is a dummy which equals 1 if a bank complies with the Basel II 
capital standards in a given year, IRB is a dummy which equals 1 if a bank adopts the internal rating-based approach to compute RWA, Standardized is a 
dummy which equals 1 if a bank has adopted the standardized approach, Shadow banking is the ratio of outstanding securitized assets to GDP, Capital 
regulation is an index of the regulatory approach to assessing and verifying the degree of capital at risk in a bank, Regulatory strength is an index of general 
regulatory strength, GDP growth is the real GDP growth rate (measured in U.S. $). Standard errors are adjusted via the finite sample correction derived by 
Windemeijer (2005), robust Z statistics are reported in round brackets. All specifications control for time dummies. Panel B computes increases in capital 
per unit of assets implied by a 1percent (5 percent) increase in asset volatility under a minimum capital ratio of 8 percent. This is calculated as the estimated 
coefficient on asset volatility*∆asset volatility*0.08*100.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: Regression Analysis 
Lagged RWATA 0.821*** 0.822*** 0.808*** 0.799*** 0.800*** 0.804*** 0.802*** 0.790*** 0.811*** 
 (23.62) (25.95) (24.74) (23.77) (24.34) (23.83) (24.21) (23.39) (23.03) 
Asset volatility 0.447*** 0.430*** 0.427*** 0.459*** 0.426*** 0.465*** 0.441*** 0.473*** 0.453*** 
 (4.06) (4.15) (4.34) (4.67) (4.24) (4.37) (4.30) (4.66) (4.10) 
Size -0.000 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.03) (1.19) (0.70) (0.64) (0.79) (0.41) (0.59) (0.49) (0.06) 
ROA 1.109*** 0.950*** 0.825** 0.738** 0.897*** 0.671** 0.855*** 0.791** 1.093*** 
 (3.18) (2.98) (2.54) (2.34) (2.79) (2.08) (2.63) (2.37) (3.04) 
Buffer -0.721*** -0.536*** -0.569*** -0.582*** -0.586*** -0.549*** -0.572*** -0.582*** -0.710*** 
 (4.36) (4.29) (4.72) (4.76) (4.62) (4.16) (4.46) (4.31) (4.53) 
Deposits  0.082*** 0.062* 0.058* 0.067* 0.061* 0.062* 0.057* 0.066* 0.079*** 
 (3.23) (1.81) (1.77) (1.83) (1.74) (1.76) (1.72) (1.78) (3.21) 
Loans   0.022 0.022 0.019 0.020 0.024 0.018 0.016  
  (0.91) (0.87) (0.80) (0.78) (0.94) (0.72) (0.62)  
Non-interest income  0.057** 0.060*** 0.062*** 0.059*** 0.064*** 0.059** 0.060**  
  (2.46) (2.64) (2.66) (2.58) (2.79) (2.55) (2.47)  
Basel II -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.004      
 (1.22) (1.00) (1.31) (0.73)      
IRB 0.016**    -0.016**  -0.016** -0.013* -0.017** 
 (2.28)    (2.54)  (2.35) (1.90) (2.32) 
Standardized -0.003     0.011 0.002 0.007 0.002 
 (0.63)     (1.54) (0.34) (0.93) (0.33) 
Shadow banking  0.011** 0.010* 0.013** 0.012* 0.016** 0.013** 0.017** 0.020*** 
  (2.04) (1.70) (2.08) (1.96) (2.46) (2.01) (2.40) (2.71) 
Capital regulation   0.004** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003* 0.004*** 
   (2.36) (2.12) (2.08) (2.19) (2.00) (1.83) (2.63) 
Regulatory strength   0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002 
   (2.88) (3.03) (3.00) (3.08) (3.02) (3.19) (1.25) 
GDP growth    0.180**    0.154*  
    (2.01)    (1.71)  
Constant 0.022 0.097 0.031 0.021 0.044 0.003 0.033 0.023 0.028 
 (0.36) (1.27) (0.40) (0.27) (0.59) (0.04) (0.44) (0.29) (0.47) 
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,015 2,015 2,015 1,996 2,015 2,015 2,015 1,996 2,015 
Number of banks 246 246 246 243 246 246 246 243 246 
m2 Statistic (p-value) 0.179 0.163 0.164 0.170 0.163 0.152 0.160 0.162 0.173 
Hansen J statistic  
(p-value) 
0.219 0.415 0.501 0.473 0.488 0.482 0.468 0.391 0.274 
Panel B: Capital Injections in % of Total Assets Linked to Increases in Asset Volatility (Min Capital Ratio =  8%) 
1%-increase  
in asset volatility 0.036 0.034 0.034 0.037 0.034 0.037 0.035 0.038 
0.036 
5%-increase  
in asset volatility 0.179 0.172 0.171 0.184 0.171 0.186 0.176 0.189 0.181 
*significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
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Table 5: Basel II and the Relationship between the Market Assessment of Bank Portfolio Risk and RWATA 
This Table shows the regression results for the dynamic panel data model presented in Section 4.1, controlling for the impact of Basel II. The 
models are estimated via the two-step GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). RWATA is the ratio between risk-weighted assets 
(RWA) and total assets, asset volatility captures the market assessment of bank portfolio risk and is measured as the value of asset volatility 
estimated via option pricing as discussed in section 3 (asset volatility has been mean-centered to avoid multicollinearity with its interactions), Size 
is the log of total assets, ROA is the ratio between net income and total assets, Buffer is the difference between the regulatory capital ratio and the 
required capital ratio, Deposits is computed as customer deposits over total liabilities, Loans is the ratio between net loans and total assets and 
Non-interest income  is the ratio of non-interest income to total operating income, Basel II is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank complies with the Basel 
II capital standards in a given year, IRB is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank adopts the Internal Rating-Based Approach to compute RWA, 
Standardized is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank adopts the Standardized Approach, Shadow banking is the ratio between the outstanding value of 
securitized assets and GDP, Capital regulation is an index of the regulatory approach to assessing and verifying the degree of capital at risk in a 
bank, Regulatory strength is an index that assesses the general regulatory strength at the country level, GDP growth is the real GDP growth rate 
(measured in U.S. $). Standard errors are adjusted via the finite sample correction derived by Windemeijer (2005). Panel B shows the impact of 
Basel II on RWATA and on the value of capital per unit of assets for banks with low and high volatile portfolios based on the regression results 
reported in Columns 2 and 8 of Table 5. Low (High) risk portfolios are defined as banks with asset volatility equal to 1 percent (5 percent). 
Changes in minimum capital requirements per unit of assets (ΔCap / TA) are calculated assuming a minimum capital ratio of 8 percent (13 
percent) of changes in RWA. The last row of Panel A and B shows the result of a Wald test on the equality between the effect produced by the 
IRB and the Standardized Approach of calculating RWA. robust Z statistics are reported in round brackets. All specifications control for time 
dummies. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent 
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Table 5 (cont’d) 
Panel A: Regression Analysis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
β1 Lagged RWATA 0.791*** 0.784*** 0.802*** 0.794*** 0.789*** 0.777*** 0.791*** 0.781*** 
  (24.63) (23.43) (24.35) (23.13) (23.00) (21.38) (23.95) (22.05) 
β2 Asset volatility 0.412*** 0.392*** 0.405*** 0.432*** 0.457*** 0.443*** 0.405*** 0.406*** 
  (4.19) (4.25) (4.15) (4.49) (4.48) (4.42) (4.18) (4.13) 
β3 Size -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
  (0.78) (0.49) (0.68) (0.57) (0.66) (0.66) (0.89) (0.67) 
β4 ROA 0.617** 0.610* 0.765** 0.763** 0.517* 0.518* 0.633** 0.611* 
  (2.05) (1.94) (2.37) (2.34) (1.65) (1.67) (2.04) (1.88) 
β5 Buffer -0.586*** -0.558*** -0.543*** -0.576*** -0.591*** -0.560*** -0.565*** -0.547*** 
  (4.18) (4.80) (4.60) (4.54) (4.26) (4.75) (4.29) (4.70) 
β6 Deposits 0.062*** 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.062*** 0.064*** 
  (2.87) (2.91) (2.97) (2.83) (2.72) (2.74) (2.95) (2.88) 
β7 Loans 0.056 0.064* 0.058* 0.061* 0.068* 0.073** 0.055 0.064* 
  (1.64) (1.79) (1.75) (1.78) (1.89) (2.01) (1.57) (1.79) 
β8 Non-interest income  0.024 0.019 0.017 0.011 0.026 0.021 0.018 0.012 
  (0.91) (0.68) (0.71) (0.45) (1.03) (0.84) (0.82) (0.48) 
β9 Basel II -0.005 -0.003       
  (0.96) (0.52)       
β10 Basel II*asset volatility 0.492** 0.446**       
  (2.36) (2.06)       
β11 IRB   -0.009 -0.009   -0.007 -0.007 
    (1.19) (1.09)   (0.93) (0.92) 
β12 IRB*asset volatility   0.703** 0.677*   0.773** 0.665** 
    (2.04) (1.88)   (2.28) (2.03) 
β13 Standardized     0.011 0.014* 0.003 0.007 
      (1.52) (1.92) (0.49) (1.06) 
β14 Standardized*asset volatility     0.400 0.288 0.363 0.294 
      (1.59) (1.12) (1.44) (1.14) 
β15 Shadow banking 0.010* 0.013** 0.011* 0.011* 0.016** 0.018** 0.012* 0.015** 
  (1.65) (2.07) (1.72) (1.86) (2.25) (2.55) (1.94) (2.36) 
β16 Capital regulation 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
  (2.93) (3.22) (2.95) (3.13) (3.01) (3.60) (3.03) (3.47) 
β17 Regulatory strength 0.004*** 0.004** 0.003** 0.003** 0.004** 0.003** 0.004** 0.003** 
  (2.62) (2.54) (1.98) (1.99) (2.57) (2.14) (2.20) (2.11) 
β18 GDP growth  0.144  0.127  0.156*  0.120 
   (1.49)  (1.40)  (1.68)  (1.29) 
 Constant 0.061 0.037 0.053 0.049 0.042 0.042 0.072 0.055 
  (0.80) (0.45) (0.80) (0.66) (0.52) (0.47) (0.98) (0.70) 
 Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Observations 2,015 1,996 2,015 1,996 2,015 1,996 2,015 1,996 
 Number of banks 246 243 246 243 246 243 246 243 
 m2 Statistic (p-value) 0.202 0.196 0.167 0.177 0.182 0.170 0.190 0.185 
 Hansen J  statistic  
(p-value) 
0.728 0.758 0.599 0.611 0.631 0.698 0.818 0.846 
 
Panel B: Changes in RWATA and Adoption of Basel II, by Asset Volatility 
 ΔRWATA (%) ΔCap/TA (%) 
 Low-risk High-risk Low-risk High-risk 
     
ΔRWATA= (β9 + β10 × asset volatility) -2.07*** 
(3.05) 
-0.11 
(3.05) 
-0.17*** 
(3.05) 
-0.00 
(0.16) 
     
IRB: 
ΔRWATA= (β11 + β12 × asset volatility) 
-2.77*** 
(2.92) 
-0.10 
(0.11) 
-0.22*** 
(2.92) 
-0.00 
(0.11) 
     
Standardized: 
ΔRWATA= (β13 + β14 × asset volatility) 
-0.20 
(0.20) 
0.98 
(0.20) 
-0.02 
(0.20) 
-0.08 
(0.20) 
     
H0: IRB = Standardized 4.70** 
(0.03) 
0.91 
(0.34) 
4.70** 
(0.03) 
0.91 
(0.34) 
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Table 6: The Market Assessment of Bank Portfolio Risk, RWATA and Capital Buffers 
Panel A shows the regression results for the dynamic panel data model as presented in Section 4.1 which controls for the interaction between capital buffer and 
portfolio volatility (asset volatility). The models are estimated via the two-step GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). RWATA is the ratio 
between risk-weighted assets (RWA) and total assets, asset volatility captures the market assessment of bank portfolio risk and is measured as the value of asset 
volatility estimated via option pricing, Size is the log of total assets, ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets, Buffer is the difference between the bank 
regulatory capital ratio and the required capital ratio in the country the bank is chartered in, Deposits is computed as customer deposits over total liabilities, Loans is 
the ratio of net loans to total assets, Non-interest income  is the ratio of non-interest income to total operating income, Basel II is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank 
complies with the Basel II capital standards in a given year, IRB is a dummy which is equal to 1 if a bank adopts the Internal Rating Based Approach to compute 
RWA, Standardized is a dummy which is equal to 1 if a bank adopts the Standardized Approach, Capital regulation is an index of the regulatory approach to 
assessing and verifying the degree of capital at risk in a bank, Regulatory strength is an index that assesses the general regulatory strength at the country level, GDP 
growth is the real GDP growth rate (measured in U.S. $). asset volatility and Buffer have been mean-centered. Standard errors are adjusted via the finite sample 
correction derived by Windemeijer (2005); robust z-statistics are reported in round brackets. All specifications control for time dummies. Panel B shows how the 
impact of asset volatility on RWATA varies with different values of Buffer. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 
 2000–2007 Full Sample Period 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Panel A: Regression Analysis 
Lagged RWATA 0.799*** 0.795*** 0.794*** 0.789*** 0.809*** 0.798*** 0.802*** 0.785*** 
 (16.20) (16.34) (15.72) (16.39) (24.08) (23.24) (24.42) (23.11) 
Asset volatility 0.615*** 0.645*** 0.610*** 0.644*** 0.515*** 0.516*** 0.547*** 0.544*** 
 (4.01) (4.19) (4.08) (4.35) (4.12) (4.19) (4.50) (4.35) 
Size -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.01) (0.26) (0.03) (0.50) (0.51) (0.53) (0.27) (0.43) 
ROA -0.359 -0.467 -0.389 -0.472 0.750** 0.806** 0.615* 0.765** 
 (0.67) (0.87) (0.71) (0.86) (2.09) (2.31) (1.80) (2.14) 
Buffer -0.393** -0.391*** -0.402*** -0.400*** -0.467*** -0.478*** -0.440*** -0.499*** 
 (2.54) (2.58) (2.73) (2.70) (4.21) (4.23) (3.85) (3.86) 
Buffer*asset volatility -1.206 -0.854 -0.885 -0.927 -4.716** -5.132** -4.657** -4.568** 
 (0.53) (0.37) (0.40) (0.39) (2.18) (2.40) (2.22) (2.09) 
Deposits 0.094*** 0.098*** 0.091*** 0.103*** 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.074*** 0.071*** 
 (3.11) (3.27) (2.77) (3.30) (3.02) (2.95) (3.17) (2.93) 
Loans 0.087** 0.091** 0.084** 0.092** 0.066** 0.070** 0.069** 0.071* 
 (2.25) (2.30) (2.03) (2.32) (1.96) (2.05) (2.07) (1.95) 
Non-interest income  0.051 0.049 0.046 0.046 0.029 0.029 0.033 0.023 
 (1.41) (1.32) (1.27) (1.36) (1.26) (1.20) (1.36) (1.02) 
Basel II -0.021***    -0.008    
 (2.73)    (1.33)    
IRB  -0.035***  -0.034***  -0.018***  -0.016** 
  (3.48)  (3.35)  (2.58)  (2.16) 
Standardized   -0.010 -0.011   0.011 0.006 
   (1.24) (1.35)   (1.53) (0.72) 
Shadow banking 0.019* 0.022** 0.022** 0.025** 0.006 0.007 0.012* 0.012* 
 (1.88) (2.14) (2.23) (2.34) (0.92) (1.18) (1.86) (1.79) 
Capital regulation 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (2.17) (2.37) (2.44) (2.36) (2.91) (2.99) (3.19) (3.19) 
Regulatory strength 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003 
 (1.17) (1.05) (1.27) (1.04) (1.94) (1.78) (1.90) (1.63) 
GDP growth    0.261**    0.136 
    (2.14)    (1.50) 
Constant -0.032 -0.055 -0.031 -0.077 -0.006 0.005 -0.025 0.002 
 (0.43) (0.74) (0.39) (0.95) (0.09) (0.08) (0.35) (0.03) 
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,386 1,386 1,386 1,386 2,015 2,015 2,015 1,996 
Number of banks 220 220 220 220 246 246 246 243 
m2 Statistic (p-value) 0.247 0.252 0.250 0.273 0.188 0.193 0.174 0.190 
Hansen J Statistic (p-value) 0.365 0.322 0.430 0.373 0.784 0.826 0.842 0.859 
Panel B: Coefficient on (Asset Volatility + Buffer*Asset Volatility), by Different Values of Buffer 
Buffer = 0% 
 
0.615*** 
(4.01) 
0.645*** 
(4.19) 
0.610*** 
(4.08) 
0.644*** 
(4.35) 
0.515*** 
(4.12) 
0.516*** 
(4.19) 
0.547*** 
(4.50) 
0.544*** 
(4.35) 
Buffer = 3% 
(25th percentile) 
0.579*** 
(4.62) 
0.619*** 
(4.90) 
0.583*** 
(4.86) 
0.616*** 
(5.12) 
0.374** 
(3.75) 
0.362*** 
(3.68) 
0.407*** 
(4.16) 
0.407*** 
(4.17) 
Buffer = 6% 
(75th percentile ) 
0.543*** 
(4.14) 
0.594*** 
(4.42) 
0.557*** 
(4.49) 
0.588*** 
(4.50) 
0.232** 
(2.06) 
0.208* 
(1.87) 
0.268** 
(2.41) 
0.270** 
(2.46) 
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Table 7: The Market Assessment of Bank Portfolio Risk and RWATA: Government vs. Market-financed Recapitalizations 
Panel A shows the regression results for the dynamic panel data model as presented in Section 4.1 which controls for the interaction between changes in capital buffers in 2008–
2009 and portfolio volatility (asset volatility) before the crisis (2000–2007). The models are estimated via the two-step GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). 
RWATA is the ratio between risk-weighted assets (RWA) and total assets, asset volatility captures the market assessment of bank portfolio risk and is measured as s the mean-
centered value of asset volatility estimated via option pricing, Size is the log of total assets, ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets,  Buffer is the difference between the 
bank regulatory capital ratio and the required capital ratio in the country the bank is chartered in, Deposits is computed as customer deposits over total liabilities, Loans is the ratio 
of net loans to total assets, Non-interest income  is the ratio of non-interest income to total operating income,  Basel II is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank complies with the Basel II 
capital standards in a given year, IRB is a dummy which is equal to 1 if a bank adopts the Internal Rating-Based Approach to compute RWA, Standardized is a dummy which is 
equal to 1 if a bank adopts the Standardized Approach, Capital regulation is an index of the regulatory approach to assessing and verifying the degree of capital at risk in a bank, 
Regulatory strength is an index that assesses the general regulatory strength at the country level, GDP growth is the real GDP growth rate (measured in U.S. $). Government 
recapitalization (Market recapitalization) is a dummy equal to 1 for banks in the highest quartile of the distribution of capital buffer increases in 2008 and 2009, which were at 
least in part financed via government purchases of participation capital (market sources of capital). Panel B shows the risk sensitivity of capital requirements for banks which 
have increased their capital buffers during the crisis due to government support. Standard errors are adjusted via the finite sample correction derived by Windemeijer (2005); 
robust z-statistics are reported in round brackets. All specifications control for time dummies. *significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: Regression Analysis 
        
Lagged RWATA 0.808*** 0.805*** 0.802*** 0.807*** 0.803*** 0.803*** 0.800*** 
 (15.20) (15.56) (14.50) (15.01) (14.76) (15.54) (15.39) 
Asset volatility 0.693*** 0.761*** 0.720*** 0.689*** 0.711*** 0.789*** 0.813*** 
 (4.52) (4.69) (4.64) (4.62) (4.78) (4.94) (5.31) 
Size 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.38) (0.61) (1.09) (0.39) (0.80) (0.35) (0.23) 
ROA -0.345 -0.401 -0.403 -0.361 -0.409 -0.486 -0.721 
 (0.72) (0.77) (0.82) (0.71) (0.84) (0.93) (1.37) 
Buffer -0.402*** -0.449*** -0.360*** -0.405*** -0.372*** -0.432*** -0.396*** 
 (3.22) (3.60) (2.72) (3.11) (2.84) (3.35) (3.08) 
Deposits 0.088*** 0.083*** 0.098*** 0.085** 0.096*** 0.091*** 0.094*** 
 (2.70) (2.89) (2.94) (2.41) (2.91) (3.18) (3.19) 
Loans 0.106** 0.109*** 0.109** 0.104** 0.108** 0.110*** 0.116*** 
 (2.51) (2.67) (2.49) (2.37) (2.53) (2.73) (2.90) 
Non-interest income  0.045 0.060* 0.038 0.037 0.042 0.058* 0.056* 
 (1.33) (1.89) (1.15) (1.07) (1.28) (1.83) (1.78) 
Basel II -0.019*** -0.022***      
 (2.60) (2.84)      
IRB   -0.037***  -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.034*** 
   (3.92)  (3.87) (3.76) (3.52) 
Standardized    -0.008 -0.010 -0.014* -0.013* 
    (1.06) (1.32) (1.71) (1.67) 
Shadow banking 0.019* 0.017* 0.023** 0.022** 0.021** 0.017* 0.022** 
 (1.94) (1.86) (2.24) (2.15) (2.03) (1.91) (2.18) 
Capital regulation 0.004** 0.003** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004** 0.003** 0.003** 
 (2.46) (1.97) (2.66) (2.74) (2.54) (2.04) (2.13) 
Regulatory strength 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (1.18) (1.23) (0.82) (1.17) (0.98) (1.03) (0.67) 
Government recapitalization 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006 
 (0.68) (0.99) (0.83) (0.79) (0.83) (1.13) (1.26) 
Asset volatility*government recapitalization -0.441** -0.415* -0.504** -0.413* -0.487** -0.432* -0.493** 
 (2.05) (1.85) (2.39) (1.87) (2.26) (1.84) (2.10) 
Market recapitalization  0.000    -0.000 -0.002 
  (0.04)    (0.07) (0.44) 
Asset volatility*market recapitalization  -0.302    -0.331 -0.302 
  (1.24)    (1.42) (1.34) 
GDP growth       0.288*** 
       (2.77) 
Constant -0.050 0.006 -0.083 -0.051 -0.070 -0.012 -0.047 
 (0.75) (0.10) (1.34) (0.67) (1.14) (0.23) (0.80) 
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,386 1,386 1,386 1,386 1,386 1,386 1,386 
Number of banks 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
m2 Statistic (p-value) 0.230 0.205 0.243 0.238 0.237 0.205 0.220 
Hansen J Statistic (p-value) 0.628 0.613 0.713 0.673 0.712 0.638 0.599 
Panel B: asset volatility Sensitivity of Capital Requirements (2000–2007) where Government Recapitalizations Occurred (2008–2009) 
asset volatility+ asset volatility 
*government recapitalization 
0.251 
(1.42) 
0.346* 
(1.78) 
0.216 
(1.19) 
0.276 
(1.43) 
0.224 
(1.19) 
0.357* 
(1.71) 
0.321 
(1.48) 
  
